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Abstract There is considerable speculation that female political empowerment
could improve population health. Yet, evidence to date is limited, and explanations
for why political empowerment would matter and the conditions under which this
might be enhanced or muted are not well understood. In this article, we draw on
theoretical work on the politics of representation to frame an investigation of
whether increases in the percentage of females in a country’s parliament influence
mortality rates. We further examine whether the relationship is conditioned by
extent of democracy and economic and social development. Through multivariate
longitudinal regression, we analyze four indicators of mortality in 155 countries
spanning 1990 to 2014 with controls for initial country conditions, time-stable
structural predispositions to higher mortality, and a number of time-varying
potential confounders. Results indicate that a high level of female representa-
tion—30 % or greater in our models—has large negative associations with mor-
tality, that these are particularly strong in lesser developed and weak democratic
contexts, that high female political representation effectively offsets liabilities
associated with low development, and that the relationships are robust to various
operationalizations of social development. In the end, our research provides a
particularly thorough accounting of the relationship between female political
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representation and population health, particularly by specifying the conditions
under which female representation is most salient. In doing so, the research
suggests important links between issues of female empowerment, political context,
and developmental trajectories of countries more generally.
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Introduction
The role of economic development in improving population health is a corner-
stone of demographic research (Coale and Hoover 2015; Deaton 2003; Preston
1975; Sen 1998). At the same time, countries with similar levels of economic
development can have strikingly different health profiles (Caldwell 1986;
Halstead et al. 1985). Figure 1, for example, plots the level of economic
development and rates of child mortality in 2010 for countries whose GDP per
capita was less than US$5,000. Two points of comparison are instructive. Among
countries in the middle of the development distribution (approximately $1,100
per capita, or 7 on the log scale), Chad has a very high rate of child mortality at
145 per 1,000, while Senegal is almost two-thirds lower at 50 per 1,000. At the
very low end of economic development ($400, or 6 on the log scale), the Central
African Republic has a rate of 140 per 1,000, while Malawi has the much lower
rate of 65 per 1,000. Even countries that also share similar cultures and geog-
raphy have widely varying mortality risks. Countries bordering the Horn of
Africa have rates ranging from 140 per 1,000 for Somalia to 60 per 1,000 for
Ethiopia and 50 per 1,000 for Kenya. Given that small differences in rates
translate into thousands of excess deaths, variation in mortality risk independent
of economic development is fundamentally problematic. It also prompts ques-
tions about whether and how some low-income countries have managed to
achieve exceptionally low mortality and whether other countries can adopt
similar strategies.
An important avenue of explanation focuses on women’s status (Caldwell 1986;
Malhotra and Schuler 2005). Previous research has posited a number of plausible
links between improved population health and increases in women’s educational
attainment (Austin and Noble 2014; Boehmer and Williamson 1996; Shandra et al.
2005; Shen and Williamson 1999; Ware 1984); female literacy (Grosse and
Auffrey 1989; Lena and London 1993); women’s labor force participation
(Kawachi et al. 1999; Navarro et al. 2006); and women’s access to land, loans,
and property (Burroway 2012, 2016). Greater control over family and fertility is
similarly beneficial, with effects seen for increased age at marriage (Finlay et al.
2011; Fraser et al. 1995) and access to contraception and other preventative health
care (Austin and Noble 2014; Shen and Williamson 1999). Although the nature
and existence of these pathways has been debated (see for example Batliwala and
Dhanraj 2004; Desai and Alva 1998; Jackson 2003), there is some consensus in
development circles that the position of women and girls should be seen as a
powerful, evidence-based policy lever (Chant 2016). As a consequence, the
empowerment of women and concomitant improvement in women’s status is a
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centerpiece of contemporary development goals and public policy (United Nations
2008, 2015).1
Our study contributes to the literature on women’s status and its implications for
population health by focusing on their position in political systems. Interest in the
health implications of women’s political status is not new. More than two decades ago,
Caldwell (1986:189) noted that the 1928 Donoughmore Commission in Ceylon
responded to “the near-stagnation in mortality decline” by advocating for “the franchise
for women as well as men on the grounds that mothers alone cared sufficiently about
their children’s health to place health services high on the political agenda at each
election.” Although extension of franchise was the first wave of improvement in
women’s political status, concerns in the contemporary era largely involve improve-
ments in women’s political representation through efforts to increase the share of
legislators who are women (Fallon et al. 2012; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton
1997). Whether and when such increases lead to substantive change, however, remains
the subject of much debate. A small body of work has explored the realm of population
health. Some research has suggested positive effects (Homan 2017; Quamruzzaman
and Lange 2016; Swiss et al. 2012), whereas others have been more equivocal
(Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2014; Boehmer and Williamson 1996; Wängnerud and
Sundell 2012). Empirical assessments of the conditions under which a higher share of
women in national legislatures effect change might help make sense of the inconclusive
evidence. Yet, few studies to date have examined such issues.
To contribute to the evidence base, we examine the influence of changes in the
percentage of a country’s legislature who are women on child and maternal mortality.
Drawing on the politics of presence literature (Celis et al. 2008; Phillips 1995) and its
emphasis on links between descriptive and substantive representation (Wängnerud
2009), we articulate two competing ideas about the social and political conditions
under which the number of female political representatives matters for population
health. We then test these ideas with a heterogeneous sample of 155 developed and
developing countries and fixed-effects regression models. In addition to a broader
sample and more thorough statistical accounting than seen in prior work, a key
innovation of our study is empirical examination of the joint influence of economic
and social development and extent of democracy on conditioning the effects of
women’s political representation in order to highlight the social backdrop that shapes
the efficacy of female political empowerment for population health.
Women’s Political Representation and Population Health
The increase in the number of women holding political office is among the most
significant social trends of recent decades. Fallon et al. (2012) noted that the percentage
of women in parliaments increased from 6.2 % to 17.8 % between 1975 and 2009.
1 Drawing on the work of Malhotra and Schuler (2005), empowerment can be described as the agentic process
of attaining the resources and opportunities necessary for an improvement in status. In contrast to other
measures of gender inequality, empowerment is a dynamic concept, measured as “a progression from one state
(gender inequality) to another (gender equality)” (p. 27). Similarly, Mason (1986) noted that the status of
women typically reflects some aspect of gender inequality, particularly with respect to prestige, power, or
access to or control over resources.
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Extending the data to 2015, the percentage increased further to 20.4 %, with 42
countries above the 30 % threshold advocated by the United Nations (United Nations
Equal Opportunities Commission 2003). At the same time, considerable variation is
evident across countries and over time, and this has spawned research on the cultural,
political, and economic factors that influence trends (Fallon et al. 2012; Kenworthy and
Malami 1999; Paxton 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003).
A common rationale for the promotion of women’s representation in politics is a
presumed link between descriptive and substantive representation. Descriptive represen-
tation emphasizes the compositional similarity between representatives and those repre-
sented and the degree to which political bodies adequately reflect diversity within the
relevant populace, typically with respect to demographic characteristics (Pitkin 1967).
Substantive representation focuses on what policymakers do—that is, the extent to which
politicians represent the interests of their constituents (Wängnerud 2009). The two types of
representation are linked to the degree that legislators may be more likely or better able to
represent interests that arise from shared or similar experiences (Mansbridge 1999). With
respect to the gender of politicians, an influential stream of thinking articulates a politics of
presence: gender differences in salient life experiences are seen to give unique orientation
and value to the presence of female politicians (Phillips 1995).
Political theorists who have sought to explain why, in a representative democracy, the
gender of representatives should matter for the policy agenda have had to engage with two
sequential questions (Wängnerud 2009). First, can women be thought of as having certain
shared interests? Researchers attempting to conceptualize women’s interests have suggested
that the gendered division of labor and other aspects of gender orders create needs that are, to
some extent, shared across otherwise diverse groups of women (Phillips 1998; Young 1994,
2002). In general, those needs that are amenable to policy—for example, surrounding
childbearing, sexual and gender-based violence, the care and education of children, and
access to paid labor—may form the basis for a broad set of women’s political interests.
Second, even if we assume that it is useful to think in terms of women’s interests, why
would politicians who are women better represent those interests? Some of the most
compelling arguments focus on the consequences of historical and institutional exclusions
that limit access to the “battleground for contested ideas” (Phillips 1994:76). A number of
previous studies have approached the question empirically, asking whether female politi-
cians reorient the policy agenda so that “women’s interests” figure more prominently and
whether their presence is associated with an improvement in the circumstances of women
and children. Studies covering a range of periods and geographical settings consistently find
that female politicians prioritize issues thought to be of particular importance to women,
including social welfare policy, family policy, and gender equality issues (Childs and Krook
2008; Jones 1997). For example, researchers in the United States found that “women were
more likely to give priority to public policies related to their traditional roles as caregivers in
the family and society—e.g., policies dealing with children and families and health care”
(Center for the American Woman and Politics 1991:4; see also Childs and Krook 2006,
2009; Kittilson 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). Evidence also suggests that increases in the
number of female politicians are associated with greater spending on social programs
(Bolzendahl 2009; Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Brady 2009; Halim et al. 2016b). Because
female politicians are more likely to prioritize maternal and child well-being, we might
expect increases in women’s representation to translate into better population health,
particularly for women and children.
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Empirical evidence, however, is somewhat equivocal. Boehmer and Williamson’s
(1996) study of 96 developing countries around 1990 found that the percentage of
women in parliaments had a small negative association with infant mortality. The
relationship, however, was fully attenuated with controls for women’s educational
attainment, suggesting that the number of female politicians might proxy greater gender
equality in society more generally. Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras’s (2014) study of
electoral districts in India between 1967 and 2001 found wide-ranging associations
for increases in the number of women in state legislatures, but associations were
stronger for neonatal mortality than for infant mortality and only with an instrumental
variable specification (i.e., whether elections were close). Quamruzzaman and Lange’s
(2016) analysis of DHS data for 52 countries found negative associations of women’s
representation on infant mortality, as did Homan’s (2017) study of gender inequality in
U.S. state legislatures between 1990 and 2012. In contrast, Wängnerud and Sundell’s
(2012) study of Swedish local elected assemblies between 1970 and 2010 found no
significant relationships with women’s health. In arguably the most comprehensive
study to date, Swiss et al. (2012) examined panel data for 102 developing countries
spanning 1980 to 2010 in five-year intervals, finding that the percentage of women in
parliaments is associated with greater infant and child survival. Against this backdrop,
we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Increases in the percentage of women in parliament will be associ-
ated with decreases in mortality risk net of other indicators of women’s status or
economic and social development.
In an effort to account for contradictory conclusions, some work has suggested that
the representation of women’s interests might be improved with a “critical mass” of
female representatives (Childs and Krook 2006, 2008; Dahlerup 2006). Swiss et al.’s
(2012) study of infant survival explicitly modeled quantile differences in the percentage
of women in parliaments and provided some evidence of threshold effects. Few other
studies however have empirically examined the critical mass hypothesis, particularly in
relation to population health. Nonetheless, the United Nations Equal Opportunities
Commission (2003) advocates for a minimum of 30 % women in governmental
leadership positions, with an overall goal of parity in order to foster both gender
equality and social development. We consider the critical mass question in our study
with the following orienting hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The negative association between increases in the percentage of
women in parliament and mortality risk will be strongest when the share of female
legislators is sufficiently high (30 % or more) net of other indicators of women’s
status or economic and social development.
Contingencies With Respect to Political Context and Social Development
In theory, politicians create policy and influence social life by interpreting needs,
shifting budgets, and marshaling resources on issues that matter to them (Pitkin
1967). Yet, political, economic, and social conditions both facilitate and inhibit such
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processes, and these factors may introduce important contingencies for the efforts of
female legislators to effect change (Mansbridge 1999, 2003). In the realm of political
organization, a considerable amount of work has focused on the extent of democracy
and its consequences (Franco et al. 2004; Ross 2006). Here, the key expectation is that
political systems that are more democratic should promote greater responsiveness to
constituents’ concerns and foster better population health (Swiss et al. 2012). In settings
where greater democratic institutionalization allows for more open and competitive
systems of candidate recruitment, institutionalized constraints on the exercise of exec-
utive power, and greater opportunities to scrutinize and push for policy proposals, we
might expect increases in women’s political representation to be more efficacious.
A second important contingency is the extent of development. In terms of economic
development, the public economics of nation-states is relatively straightforward. Be-
cause governments amass revenues through processes of extraction—extraction from
exploitation of natural resources, from corporate taxation, and from income tax
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 2015)—economic development and government expenditure
are directly related: countries with larger GDP per capita have greater capacity.
Extrapolating from this, one would expect that the efficacy of women’s political
representation will increase when more resources are available and, at least hypothet-
ically, competition for scarce resources is reduced.
Although these arguments suggest that the ability of female legislators to steer
resources and enact policies is enhanced when greater economic development is
combined with a greater extent of democracy, an alternative hypothesis begins from
the standpoint that gendered institutional contexts can impede efforts of descriptive
representatives to effect change (Childs and Krook 2009). In some contexts, descriptive
representatives—particularly activists representing the interests of historically excluded
groups—may have unique opportunities to exert influence under conditions of
political-economic vulnerability and transition, when institutions are being designed
or redeveloped. “By successfully intervening to insert new actors, new values, and new
rules into new institutions, reformers may profoundly influence the future develop-
ments of an institution . . . [T]he goal is to set off fledgling institutions along
progressive paths, thus counteracting . . . bias and . . . power imbalances found in
most traditional political institutions” (Mackay 2014:549). Moreover, interests in
contexts of institutional transition may be relatively “uncrystallized” so that political
parties and interest groups lack a clear strategic position or approach. In the absence of
better information, the shared experiences of descriptive representatives can provide the
only signal that a political actor is likely to respond to particular issues as a voter would
(Mansbridge 1999).
From an empirical perspective, the relevant contextual factors can be difficult to
observe or measure directly (Waylen 2014), yet indicators of the level of economic and
social development and the extent of democracy may be suitable proxies. Countries
with a lower extent of democracy are especially vulnerable to political instability, such
as outbreaks of armed conflict, unexpected changes in leadership, or adverse regime
changes (e.g., a seizure of power by a personalistic or military leader) (Marshall and
Cole 2014:21). Yet, such regimes are also more likely to initiate substantial political
reforms with opportunities for institutional engineering and innovation (Mackay 2014).
Still, because of legacies of conflict, instability, and separatism, these countries may
also face challenges of trust and communication that impair the substantive
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representation of some groups, particularly those historically marginalized (Mansbridge
1999). Given that women have traditionally been excluded from political participation,
particularly in malfunctioning democracies that have tended to adopt suffrage later and
have been more likely to have rules barring women from political office (Martin 2000;
Nelson and Caudhuri 1994), increased numbers of women in the political arena might
be expected to help establish ability to rule and increase the polity’s de facto legitimacy
(Mansbridge 1999:628).
Moreover, when democracy is not well functioning, many “democratic” apparatus-
es, such as competitive elections and freedom of press, are either underdeveloped or
missing. As a consequence, we may expect that malnourished children, poor hygiene,
or limited maternal care might not be “picked up” by the press or included in the policy
agenda of politicians who compete for office. Female legislators in these contexts may
act as a unique and innovative voice for such issues. To the extent that weaker
democracy signals democratic deficits whereby some ideas are difficult to express or
are silenced and the range of perspectives and possibilities curtailed, descriptive
representatives can serve an ameliorative function. Thus, we can think of women
representatives as a “substitute for” rather than a “complement of” democracy. As a
result, we would expect that female representatives would be more consequential in
low democratic contexts.
A parallel argument emerges when considering extent of economic and social
development. Because a sufficient economic surplus is a prerequisite for the
development of a welfare state and the government bureaucracy that supports it
(Quadagno 1987; Wilensky 1974), social welfare programs are likely to be
underdeveloped and interests are likely to be less entrenched when development
is low. Such contexts could indicate an opportunity for institutional design, when
descriptive representatives could create social welfare infrastructures rather than
having to work within existing biases and constraints and/or fight to amend them.
Still, considerable criticism surrounds economic development, particularly when
measured by indicators like GDP per capita, as a catchall indicator of develop-
ment. As Sen (1988:13) noted, “even though an expansion of GNP, given other
things, should enhance the living conditions of people, . . . there are many other
variables that also influence the living conditions, and the concept of development
cannot ignore the role of these other variables.” In this respect, the literature
identifies other aspects of development, particularly with respect to income,
education, other indicators of women’s status, and urbanization. Such a view
highlights the need to consider broader-based and alternative indicators of social
development instead of or alongside GDP per capita.
Given the different expectations of the effectiveness of female political representa-
tion under different political-economic contexts, we offer the following competing
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Increases in the percentage of women in parliament should reduce
mortality to a larger extent in countries characterized by a high extent of democ-
racy and high social development.
Hypothesis 4: Increases in the percentage of women in parliament should reduce
mortality to a larger extent in countries characterized by a low extent of democracy
and low social development.
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Empirical evidence of contingencies in the effects of women in parliament on popu-
lation health is scant and contradictory. Boehmer and Williamson (1996) examined the
interaction of the percentage of women in parliament and economic development and
found no significant contingencies. In contrast, Swiss et al. (2012) reported that higher
proportions of female legislators are most strongly associated with health when economic
development and women’s secondary enrollment are low. At the same time, they reported
no significant interaction with extent of democracy. The question of whether joint
influences of political and social development exist has not been considered. Whether
other aspects of social development are implicated has also not been considered. Conse-
quently, we know less than we could about women’s representation, democratic institu-
tionalization, and development and about how these factors might shape population
health. We explicitly pursue such issues in the following empirical analyses.
Methods
Data
Our broadest sample for cross-national mortality covers 155 countries, spans 1990 to
2014, and includes more than 2,300 country-years. We have been deliberately inclusive
in our selection of countries and have much broader coverage of countries than seen in
previous work. Our sample also captures the third wave of democratization that
occurred among former Soviet countries after the break up of the USSR, as well as
sub-Saharan Africa through the 1990s (Diamond 1996). The only country-years that
were excluded were those with missing information on select measures. The average
number of years per country is 15.4. A full list of countries in the analytic sample is
shown in Table S1 in the online appendix.
Measures
Unless otherwise indicated, measures were taken from the World Bank (2017) data-
base. Indicators of population health include rates of neonatal mortality (less than 30
days), infant morality (less than 1 year of age), child mortality (less than 5 years of age),
and maternal mortality (modeled per 100,000 births). Although mortality data from
some countries have been problematic, the original collection agencies—including the
UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation, the UN Population Division,
and the World Health Organization (WHO)—have developed extensive protocols for
internal and external validation (Ahmed et al. 2014; WHO Department of Information,
Evidence and Research 2016; You et al. 2015). We use the multiple outcomes to assess
robustness of results. Although these outcomes clearly differ in etiology and social
dynamics, we view them as complementary measures of population health.
Our focal variable of interest is women’s political representation, which we measure as
the percentage of the national parliament—specifically, a country’s “lower house”—that are
women in January of each year between 1990 and 2014. The data were compiled by the
Inter-Parliamentary Union (2016) on the basis of information provided by 170 individual
national parliaments. Given that the idea of a critical mass has gained wide currency among
politicians, the media, and international organizations (Childs and Krook 2008:725), we
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differentiate country-periods forwhich the proportion ofwomen in parliament is (a) less than
10 % (the reference category); (b) between 10 % and 20 %; (c) between 20 % and 30 %; or
(d) greater than 30%. The latter category is based on theUnitedNations EqualOpportunities
Commission (2003) recommendation. Because any cutoff point is somewhat arbitrary, we
conducted robustness checks at all thresholds above 15 % women in parliament, and the
results reported here are consistent when the upper boundary is fixed at any value above
25 %. In our data, 38 % of country-periods have fewer than 10 % legislators who are
women; 34% have between 10% and 20%; 16% have between 20% and 30%; and 11%
of country-periods have 30 % or more.
Because a key focus of our research is health implications of political and develop-
mental context, our initial models include measures of economic development and
extent of democracy. For the former, we include (logged) gross domestic product per
capita in current U.S. dollars. The latter is measured as the extent of democracy based on
the Polity IV index (Polity IV Project 2016). The Polity scheme documents executive
recruitment, checks and constraints on executive authority, and the extent and efficacy of
political competition; it includes information on institutions of the central government or
political groups acting or reacting within the scope of that authority. It is worth noting
that this measure focuses on the procedures and institutional setup of the state that allow
genuine political competition and meaningful constraints on the authority of the exec-
utive. It does not directly measure whether all political interests are represented, and a
country’s score would not change automatically if the proportion of female representa-
tives increased. Consistent with this and with prior work, the percentage of women in
parliament is not directly correlated with the extent of democracy and has only a weak
relationship with economic development (Fallon et al. 2012; Kenworthy and Malami
1999; Paxton 1997). The index is a 21-point scale, with the key differentiations being
autocracies (–10 to –6), anocracies2 (–5 to 5), and democracies (6 to 10).3
In addition, we control for or condition on other aspects of social development, as well
as other potential determinants of mortality risk. Women’s labor force participation and
gender parity in gross secondary enrollment capture other aspects of women’s social
standing. Improvements in both are recognized as indicators of women’s empowerment
(UNWomen 2017) and hence control for mortality reductions stemming from changes in
women’s status in realms other than politics. Because educational expansion is often
associated with improvements in population health (Baker et al. 2011), we include a
measure of the extent of mass education, which is a factor score based on a combination of
gross secondary enrollment (of both males and females) and the average years of
education completed (UNESCO 2016). We also capture different types of demographic
risks through the crude birth rate, the dependency ratio, and the percentage of the
population living in urban settings. We also include a measure of exposure to war that
indexes the total extent of interstate and civil conflict for a given country in a given year
(Marshall 2005). Finally, the logged number of NGOs in a given country-year is included
(Longhofer et al. 2016). In follow-up analyses of alternative specifications, we consider
2 “Governments [that] are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic . . . [are] often [an] incoherent mix of
democratic and autocratic traits and practices (Marshall and Cole 2014:21).”
3 To assess the robustness of our results, we also examined political effects with respect to the Freedom House
index of political rights and civil liberties (see https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-
2015#.Wyf8shJKj_R), a combined factor score of the Polity IV and Freedom House measures, and the
Herfindahl index of concentration of political power. Results were substantively similar for all measures.
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(logged) gross national income as a substitute for GDP per capita. Descriptive statistics for
all measures are shown in Table 1.
Statistical Analysis
Given our primary interest in fluctuations in mortality with changes in women’s
representation, our regression models include country dummy variables to hold con-
stant initial country conditions that could predispose countries for higher mortality. This
strategy also controls for any time-invariant coding biases that may exist because of
variation in the structure and practices of country-level surveillance systems. We also
include year dummy variables to capture trends over time. Thus, our initial model,
which tests the first two hypotheses, is
MRit ¼ α þ γ1kFEMREPkit − 1 þ β1LNGDPit þ β2DEMOCit þ β3CBRit þ β4DEPit
þβ5EMEit þ β6GPGSEit þ β7FLFPit þ β8URBit þ β9WARit
þβ10LNNGOit þ μi þ νt þ εit;
ð1Þ
Table 1 Summary statistics (panels = 2,387, countries = 155)
Variables Mean SD Min. Max.
Neonatal Mortality 16.197 13.930 1.000 68.900
Infant Mortality 30.563 30.312 1.600 159.700
Child Mortality 43.510 49.994 2.000 328.200
Maternal Mortality 194.930 293.131 3.000 2,700.000
Percentage of Women in Parliament
Less than 10 % 0.380 0.485 0.000 1.000
10 % to 19.9 % 0.344 0.475 0.000 1.000
20 % to 29.9 % 0.160 0.367 0.000 1.000
30 % or more 0.116 0.320 0.000 1.000
Extent of Democracy 4.717 6.148 –10.000 10.000
Logged GDP per Capita 8.232 1.638 4.664 11.674
Crude Birth Rate 21.991 11.522 7.600 55.122
Dependency Ratio 62.326 18.437 17.031 112.683
Extent of Mass Education 0.001 1.407 –3.162 2.947
Gender Parity in Gross Secondary Enrollment 0.963 0.102 0.488 1.295
Female Labor Force Participation 50.532 15.727 9.244 90.788
Urbanization 57.534 22.587 5.416 100.0
Exposure to War 0.450 1.307 0.000 10.0
Logged NGOs 7.067 0.972 0.000 8.747
Logged GNI per Capita1 8.202 1.643 4.700 11.560
Note: Logged GNI per capita is based on 2,334 panels because of missing data.
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where i is country, and t is year. MR is a mortality risk indicator, FEMREPk is the
proportion of lower house representatives who are women divided into four k categories
(less than 10 %, 10 % to 19.9 %, 20 % to 29.9 %, and 30 % or more), LNGDP is logged
GDP per capita, DEMOC indicates extent of democracy, CBR is the crude birth rate,
DEP is the dependency ratio, EME is the extent of mass education, GPGSE is gender
parity in gross secondary enrollment, FLFP is women’s labor force participation,URB is
the percentage of the population living in urban settings,WAR is the index of exposure to
war, and LNNGO is the natural log of the number of NGOs. The model also includes μ
as a set of country fixed effects, ν as a set of year fixed effects, and ε as the error term.
Because it takes time for policies to be passed and implemented and to have an observed
effect on mortality outcomes, we lag the effects of female political representation. Based
on evidence from recent studies that inappropriately long lags can introduce substantial
bias and errors of inference (Vaisey and Miles 2017), we use a short lag (t – 1). We did,
however, assess robustness using models with contemporaneous effects as well as lags
of two, three, four, five, and 10 years and achieved virtually identical results. For
estimated parameters, α is a constant, and the γs and βs are coefficients.
We offer three rationales for a fixed-effects approach. First, it is well recognized that
fixed-effects models are better able to control for unobserved heterogeneity that can bias
coefficients (Halaby 2004). With the exception of Homan (2017), prior work has used
either a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) or random-effects approach, raising
concerns of bias due to omitted time-stable factors. Second, a short-term horizon among
elected officials is expected because politicians logically recognize their ephemeral
status given finite election cycles (typically four-year cycles in length) and hence need
to produce policy outcomes, particularly those that are attributable to their own actions,
in order to have a compelling case for reelection (Mansbridge 2003). Finally, Sargan-
Hansen tests that compare fit of a random-effects versus fixed-effects specification when
robust standard errors are used support the latter specification (see Arellano 1993).
To capture potential political-developmental contingencies, our Hypotheses 3 and 4,
we elaborate the initial model by adding product terms:
MRit ¼ α þ γ1kFEMREPkit − 1 þ β1LNGDPit þ β2DEMOCit þ β3CBRit þ β4DEPit
þβ5EMEit þ β6GPGSEit þ β7FLFPit þ β8URBit þ β9WARit
þβ10LNNGOit þ μi þ υt þ εit þ β11 LNGDPit  DEMOCitð Þ
þγ2k FEMREPkit − 1  LNGDPitð Þ þ γ3k FEMREPkit − 1  DEMOCitð Þ
þϕk FEMREPkit − 1  LNGDPit  DEMOCitð Þ;
ð2Þ
where the terms are as before but with additional γs and βs for the two-way interac-
tions and ϕ coefficients to capture the vector of three-way interactions of women’s
representation categories, extent of democracy, and economic development.4 In subse-
quent models, we substitute different indicators of economic and social development
for logged GDP per capita.
4 To ensure adequate data points of support, we examined the cross-classification of female political
empowerment, extent of democracy, and economic development. We found a minimum of 400 country-
years in each of the relevant cross-classifications.
1916 R. Macmillan et al.
We estimate regression models using the XT protocol in Stata 14.1, and we use cluster-
corrected robust standard errors. Improvement in model fit with the contingency models is
assessed by the change in the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistic between more
complex and less complex (nested) models. Because the interpretation of n-way interactions
is complicated, we calculate marginal effects to show estimated mortality rates at different
levels of women’s representation, development, and extent of democracy.
Results
Our analyses begin by examining main effects (Table 2). In the case of neonatal
mortality, all coefficients are negative and become increasingly negative with higher
proportions of female legislators, but none are statistically significant. The same applies
to child mortality. In the case of infant mortality, the coefficients also become more
negative with increasing percentages of female legislators, but the coefficient for 30 %
or more threshold is statistically significant (b = –5.459, p < .05). A similar pattern is
seen for maternal mortality, but here the coefficients are statistically significant for both
the 20 % to 29 % (b = –24.171, p < .01) and the 30 % or more thresholds (–66.716, p <
.05). Both extent of democracy and economic development have reasonably robust
negative associations with mortality rates. Moreover, both crude birth rate and exposure
to war are positively associated with mortality rates, whereas mortality rates are lower
in relation to gender parity in gross secondary enrollment. Other variables largely show
null associations across outcomes. In general, the findings provide no support for
Hypothesis 1 and, at best, marginal support for Hypothesis 2.
Because associations that are conditional on political, economic, and social-
developmental context are masked in models that assume that the association is
uniform, we next fit a series of models with two- and three-way interactions and assess
change in goodness of fit. Focusing first on GDP per capita (see Table 3), the inclusion
of each two-way interaction (i.e., women’s representation by extent of democracy,
women’s representation by economic development, and extent of democracy by
economic development) significantly improves fit over the main effects model. Raftery
(1995) suggested that a change in BIC of more than 10 indicates very strong support for
the models with the lower value; we have change values ranging from –93.9 to –175.4
for neonatal mortality, from –173.0 to –378.9 for infant mortality, from –170.4 to
–374.7 for child mortality, and from –181.4 to –392.1 for maternal mortality. With the
inclusion of the three-way interaction, women’s representation by extent of democracy
by economic development, BIC values range between 395 to 802 less than the main
effects model and are over 200 less than any of the two-way interaction models.
For the other indicators of economic and social development, the corresponding
BIC statistics for each model are available in the online appendix, Table S2. To
summarize these findings, the models with two-way interactions provide significant
improvements in fit over the main effects model in all cases except one (out of 60);
changes in BIC values range from –18.4 to –528.6, with most exceeding 100. When
the three-way interaction is included, almost all resulting differences exceed –200
compared with the models including two-way interactions. Thus, the BIC statistics
indicate uniformly strong support for the models with three-way interactions across
all development indicators. To conserve space, we show the corresponding
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coefficients for the logged GDP per capita model in Table 4 and report the
coefficients for models with other social and economic development indicators in
the online appendix, Tables A3.1 to A3.5.
Interpretation of parameters in models with higher-order interactions is complicated
because of the contingent nature of the implied associations. To illustrate the meaning
of these interactions, we estimate mortality rates based on the model for each category
Table 2 Maximum likelihood fixed-effect coefficients: Mortality risk regressed on female political empow-
erment, political infrastructure index, economic development, and select control variables
Neonatal
Mortality
Infant
Mortality
Child
Mortality
Maternal
Mortality
Percentage of Women in Parliament (ref. = < 10 %)
10 % to 19 % –0.177 –0.473 –1.634 –6.071
(0.338) (0.862) (1.805) (8.137)
20 % to 29 % –0.783 –1.624 –3.507 –24.171*
(0.438) (1.222) (2.236) (11.650)
30 % or more –1.175 –5.459* –8.977 –66.716*
(0.817) (2.739) (5.046) (31.785)
Extent of Democracy –0.118 –0.619*** –1.246*** –4.927**
(0.065) (0.197) (0.387) (1.833)
Logged GDP per Capita –2.524*** –6.265*** –9.994*** –28.240***
(0.389) (0.959) (1.818) (10.287)
Crude Birth Rate 0.248* 0.769** 1.297* 7.843***
(0.109) (0.277) (0.528) (2.425)
Dependency Ratio 0.025 –0.036 –0.380 –1.036
(0.045) (0.137) (0.292) (1.006)
Extent of Mass Education –1.226 –1.046 –0.270 25.285
(0.634) (1.507) (2.901) (16.274)
Gender Parity in Secondary Enrollment –34.002*** –88.292*** –181.107*** –707.063***
(5.295) (13.660) (29.377) (107.137)
Female Labor Force Participation 0.061 0.060 –0.115 1.502
(0.049) (0.130) (0.298) (1.182)
Urbanization –0.058 0.055 –0.020 –1.231
(0.078) (0.208) (0.396) (2.282)
Exposure to War Index 0.404** 0.940* 1.591 10.944*
(0.154) (0.476) (0.828) (5.487)
Logged NGOs –0.433** –0.294 –0.038 4.330
(0.205) (0.452) (0.770) (3.360)
Constant 66.696*** 151.903*** 309.844*** 996.429***
(11.009) (26.611) (62.665) (196.287)
Number of Observations 2,387 2,387 2,387 2,387
Number of Countries 155 155 155 155
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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of women’s representation when extent of democracy is fixed at low (0, or weak
anocracy; e.g., contemporary Haiti, Libya, or Somalia) and high (7, or moderately
strong democracy; e.g., contemporary Bolivia, Pakistan, or Thailand) values, when
development is fixed at low and high values (typically ±1 standard deviation from the
mean), and when all other variables are held at their means. For our initial example, we
estimate mortality rates with logged GDP set at the values of 7 (low) and 9 (high). We
deliberately use values that are realistic given the distributions of country-years by
extent of democracy and economic development (i.e., estimation is made where
statistical support is strong). Given that our outcomes are complementary indicators
of population health, we describe the results for infant mortality in detail and then note
similarities and differences with respect to the other outcomes. These are shown in
panels a to d of Fig. 2.
Table 3 Bayesian information criterion (BIC) goodness-of-fit statistics: Hierarchical interaction models
Model BIC Δ BIC
1. Neonatal Mortality
a. Main effects 9,916.8 ––
b. Percentage of women in parliament × Economic development 9,714.4 –175.4
c. Economic development × Extent of democracy 9,767.3 –149.5
d. Percentage of women in parliament × Extent of democracy 9,822.9 –93.9
e. Percentage of women in parliament × Extent of democracy × Economic
development
9,521.4 –395.4
2. Infant Mortality
a. Main effects 14,919.0 ––
b. Percentage of women in parliament × Economic development 14,540.1 –378.9
c. Economic development × Extent of democracy 14,641.4 –277.6
d. Percentage of women in parliament × Extent of democracy 14,746.0 –173.0
e. Percentage of women in parliament × Extent of democracy × Economic
development
14,159.6 –759.4
3. Child Mortality
a. Main effects 18,029.9 —
b. Percentage of women in parliament × Economic development 17,655.2 –374.7
c. Economic development × Extent of democracy 17,756.4 –273.5
d. Percentage of women in parliament × Extent of democracy 17,859.5 –170.4
e. Percentage of women in parliament × Extent of democracy × Economic
development
17,267.3 –762.6
4. Maternal Mortality
a. Main effects 25,721.7 ––
b. Percentage of women in parliament × Economic development 25,329.6 –392.1
c. Economic development × Extent of democracy 25,540.3 –181.4
d. Percentage of women in parliament × Extent of democracy 25,449.8 –271.9
e. Percentage of women in parliament × Extent of democracy × Economic
development
24,919.2 –802.5
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Table 4 Maximum likelihood fixed-effect coefficients: Mortality risk regressed on female political empow-
erment, political infrastructure index, logged GDP per capita, and their interaction, along with select control
variables
Neonatal
Mortality
Infant
Mortality
Child
Mortality
Maternal
Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logged GDP per capita (development
indicator)
–3.491***
(0.456)
–10.046***
(1.360)
–17.980***
(2.702)
–62.512***
(12.929)
Percentage of Women in Parliament (ref. = <10 %)
10 % to 19 % –1.213
(2.973)
–1.615
(8.499)
–17.475
(17.980)
–81.654
(93.163)
20 % to 29 % –4.678
(2.834)
–30.209***
(8.420)
–70.561***
(15.601)
–381.870***
(64.587)
30 % or more –17.845***
(4.380)
–97.316***
(11.060)
–192.376***
(20.458)
–1,125.844***
(189.076)
Extent of Democracy –0.557*
(0.287)
–3.045***
(0.715)
–6.317***
(1.473)
–27.227***
(9.207)
Interactions
Extent of democracy × Percentage of
women in parliament: 10 % to 19 %
–0.887**
(0.360)
–2.202**
(0.860)
–3.229**
(1.633)
–9.664
(9.138)
Extent of democracy × Percentage of
women in parliament: 20 % to 29 %
–0.972***
(0.341)
–0.254
(0.843)
–0.125
(1.535)
22.864***
(7.723)
Extent of democracy × Percentage of
women in parliament: 30 % or more
0.229
(0.577)
6.193***
(1.502)
13.788***
(2.629)
96.174***
(28.901)
Development indicator × Percentage of
women in parliament: 10 % to 19 %
0.177
(0.395)
0.147
(1.168)
2.147
(2.396)
10.851
(12.446)
Development indicator × Percentage of
women in parliament: 20 % to 29 %
0.426
(0.395)
3.672***
(1.101)
8.761***
(2.028)
46.100***
(9.241)
Development indicator × Percentage of
women in parliament: 30 % or more
2.051***
(0.570)
11.582***
(1.458)
23.182***
(2.680)
132.210***
(21.576)
Extent of democracy × Development
indicator
0.079**
(0.039)
0.385***
(0.097)
0.801***
(0.190)
3.480***
(1.195)
Extent of democracy × Development
indicator × Percentage of women in
parliament: 10 % to 19 %
0.094*
(0.047)
0.257*
(0.120)
0.353
(0.227)
0.938
(1.259)
Extent of democracy × Development
indicator × Percentage of women in
parliament: 20 % to 29 %
0.114*
(0.045)
0.002
(0.100)
–0.074
(0.180)
–2.847***
(1.014)
Extent of democracy × Development
indicator × Percentage of women in
parliament: 30 % or more
–0.030
(0.066)
–0.750***
(0.165)
–1.656***
(0.285)
–11.227***
(3.118)
Control Variables
Crude birth rate 0.265***
(0.095)
0.793***
(0.233)
1.313***
(0.444)
7.313***
(2.061)
Dependency ratio –0.010
(0.042)
–0.178
(0.127)
–0.664**
(0.277)
–2.108**
(0.942)
Extent of mass education –1.510**
(0.623)
–2.476*
(1.403)
–3.527
(2.641)
7.921
(11.475)
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Estimated associations for increased women’s political representation and infant
mortality are pronounced (see Panel a, Fig. 2). Here, the estimated mortality rate is
24 per 1,000 when women hold at least 30 % of parliamentary seats and levels of
democracy and economic development are low. This is significantly lower than all
other estimates in contexts of low development and low democracy (ranging from 35 to
40 per 1,000). It is also statistically indistinguishable from any of the mortality
estimates at higher levels of economic development (20 to 30 per 1,000). The differ-
ence in estimated mortality risk when the proportion of female legislators is lowest and
highest (40 vs. 24 per 1,000) corresponds to approximately 53 % of a standard
deviation for infant mortality (≈ 30), a magnitude that would be considered large by
conventional metrics. Finally, when women hold at least 30 % of parliamentary seats,
improved mortality outcomes are also observed in contexts of high democracy and low
development. The estimated mortality rate is somewhat higher (28 per 1,000) than that
in contexts of low democracy and low development, but it is still significantly lower
than when women hold less than 10 % of parliamentary positions.
For the other outcomes, four points are noteworthy. First, associations are somewhat
weaker for neonatal mortality (see panel b, Fig. 2). There is still evidence of a 30 %
threshold effect in contexts of low democracy and low development (16 per 1,000),
which is less than that seen when women’s political representation is lower (20 per
1,000). Compared with the other outcomes, however, the magnitude of the differences
is smaller. Second, the pattern of estimated rates is very similar for child and maternal
mortality, with strong evidence of health benefits when women hold at least 30 % of
parliamentary seats in contexts of low democracy and development. Here, the estimated
Table 4 (continued)
Neonatal
Mortality
Infant
Mortality
Child
Mortality
Maternal
Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender parity in secondary enrollment –28.202***
(4.524)
–66.762***
(11.234)
–139.705***
(23.331)
–513.368***
(92.497)
Female labor force participation –0.027
(0.047)
–0.211*
(0.112)
–0.625**
(0.273)
–0.688
(0.718)
Urbanization –0.029
(0.067)
0.120
(0.166)
0.096
(0.311)
–0.729
(1.535)
Exposure to war index 0.162
(0.103)
0.068
(0.291)
0.042
(0.529)
3.134
(3.253)
Logged NGOs –0.587***
(0.209)
–0.912**
(0.421)
–1.226*
(0.738)
–1.019
(2.413)
Logged GDP per capita — — — —
Constant 73.087***
(10.150)
178.589***
(25.084)
367.419***
(61.787)
1,235.500***
(176.945)
Number of Observations 2,387 2,387 2,387 2,387
Number of Countries 155 155 155 155
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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rates are 30 per 1,000 (see panel c, Fig. 2) and 50 per 100,000 (see panel d, Fig. 2). In
relation to women’s low political representation in this context, the differences in
estimated effects are large (30 vs. 60 per 1,000 for child mortality, and 50 vs. 250
per 100,000 for maternal mortality) and correspond to more than 60 % of a standard
deviation in the outcomes (≈ 50.0 and 293, respectively). Third, the population health
gains associated with 30 % or more women in parliament generally offset liabilities
associated with low economic development. For both child and maternal mortality, all
estimated rates when GDP per capita is high either are not significantly different than
that at the 30 % level of representation in contexts of low democracy and low
development (i.e., confidence intervals overlap) or are actually higher (i.e., 23 to 40
per 1,000 for child mortality, and 140 to 190 per 100,000 for maternal mortality).
Finally, estimated mortality is also comparatively lower in contexts of high democracy
and low development when women hold at least 30 % of parliamentary seats (com-
pared with 0 % to 10 % of seats), although the estimated mortality advantage is
considerably smaller than in contexts of low democracy and low development (40
vs. 55 per 1,000 for child mortality, and 150 vs. 240 per 100,000 for maternal
mortality). In general, these findings provide strong support for Hypothesis 4 and are
contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 3.
Alternative Specifications
As noted earlier, the use of measures like GDP per capita as a catchall indicator of
development is the subject of considerable criticism. Hence, we examine alternative
specifications of our model using five different measures of social development: (1)
logged gross national income; (2) human development index values; (3) extent of mass
education; (4) gender parity in gross secondary enrollment; and (5) urbanization. Each
of these specifications provides a lens into both the robustness of our earlier results and
the degree that the women’s representation–democracy–development nexus operates
more generally. For the first two measures, our models substitute these alternative
measures of development for log GDP per capita and are estimated as before. In the
latter cases, the variables are already in our models, and we simply swap them for
logged GDP per capita in the interaction terms. Because the statistical gains of
including three-way interactions were supported in all cases (see the online appendix,
Table S2), we again calculate and interpret estimated mortality rates to describe the
complex contingencies indicated by interactions.
To summarize these findings (see Figs. 3 to 6), we note four main patterns to the
estimates. First, evidence of population health gains due to increases in the percentage
of legislators who are women is weakest in the case of neonatal mortality. Although
gains are still evident with high women’s representation at low levels of democracy and
development, significantly lower mortality is seen only for gross national income,
extent of mass education, and gender parity in secondary enrollment. Still, these
estimates are sufficiently low that they are still statistically indistinguishable from rates
at higher levels of social development. This is not the case for estimates at lower levels
of women’s representation in contexts of low democracy and low development.
Second, the estimated associations for 30 % or more women in parliament is
robustly observed for four of the five indicators of social development for infant, child,
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and maternal mortality at low levels of democracy and development. In each case, we
find no substantive differences between lower levels of women’s political representa-
tion but large and robust differences compared with when the share of seats held by
women is at least 30 %. Taking gross national income as an example, the differences in
estimated rates between low and high representation when democracy and development
are low are –20, –39, and –250 for infant, child, and maternal mortality, respectively.
These translate into more than 50 % of a standard deviation change in mortality risk
and would be considered very large by conventional standards. For extent of mass
education, the differences in estimated rates are –22, –40, and –250 between the lowest
and highest thresholds of seats held by women. Again, these translate into more than
50 % of a standard deviation change in mortality risk. Although magnitudes differ
slightly, a similar pattern is seen for gender parity in secondary enrolment and for
urbanization. Finally, when the share of legislators who are women is at least 30 %,
differences in mortality risk between less-developed and more-developed countries are
virtually eliminated. Estimated mortality rates when representation exceeds 30 % are
either statistically indistinguishable or lower than estimated risk in more-developed
contexts. In summary, we find large, robust associations between high female repre-
sentation and mortality rates across multiple and diverse indicators of social and
economic development.
Discussion
There is little debate that economic development is associated with improvements in
population health, yet variation in the association raises questions about the role of
other social dynamics. How these factors either help connect development to better
population health or help offset deficits in the relationship is a fundamental and
ongoing question. In this article, we have focused on the role of women’s political
representation. In particular, we have examined the achievement of UN recommenda-
tions for a critical mass of 30 % of parliamentary seats, how this connects with extent of
democracy and level of development, and how these, in combination, might affect
mortality rates for mothers and children.
We found that women’s political representation was associated with significant
decreases in mortality for women and children, with large associations when women
hold at least 30 % of parliamentary seats in contexts of low extent of democracy and
low economic and social development. These findings suggest that women’s political
representation could be a unique aspect of sociopolitical development having particu-
larly important consequences for population health. Moreover, because we controlled
for many factors that female representatives might also prioritize and that might
promote better health (e.g., gender parity in gross secondary enrollment), the total
effect of women’s representation on health might be even greater.
In framing the findings, we have emphasized the idea that the efficacy of efforts
by female politicians to represent the interests of women depends on extent of
democracy and economic and social development. Although there are competing
ideas about how exactly the joint effects might operate, our results point convinc-
ingly to women’s representation offsetting political and developmental limitations.
This finding is consistent with arguments that descriptive representatives will
1928 R. Macmillan et al.
improve the substantive representation of their group’s interests in the presence of
certain democratic deficits: specifically, where group mistrust is high, where inter-
ests are less crystallized, where ability to rule is questionable, and where de facto
legitimacy is low (Mansbridge 1999). Given that other work has suggested a
relationship to democracy that is opposite to what we observe (cf. Caldwell 1986;
Swiss et al. 2012), our findings should not be the last word on such issues. We hope
that our work fosters future theoretical and empirical study of sociopolitical context
and its implications for population dynamics.
Our findings may also provide insight into how developmental gains may accrue
from social policies that advance multiple, interlinked objectives. Large-scale social
programming, such as that targeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals (see,
e.g., United Nations Millennium Project 2005), operates on two logics. First,
development is fostered through the achievement of multiple goals that target
different aspects of social and economic conditions. Second, development prospects
are enhanced when goals operate in tandem. One interpretation of our research is
that increases in women’s representation indicate increased political empowerment
(United Nations Women 2017). That this increased political empowerment is tied to
improvements in population health suggests synergies between policies that in-
crease women’s political status more broadly (e.g., women occupying leadership
positions in parties, serving on committees, and being appointed as cabinet mem-
bers) and policies that seek to reduce mortality among women and children,
particularly at earlier stages of developmental continuums.
Our work is not without limitations, some of which highlight important areas for
future research. First, because our analytic approach is observational, we are unable to
interpret the estimated associations as causal effects. Although fixed-effects models
control for all time-stable attributes of countries, they are still vulnerable to bias from
time-varying influences. We attempted to mitigate this with a coherent set of time-
varying controls, but all caveats about causal inference remain. Second and related,
changing norms and values around gender may undermine the unique importance of
women’s political representation. As noted earlier, increases in the number of women in
politics are associated with broad-ranging political, ideational, and economic processes
(Fallon et al. 2012; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Consequently, one could think that
support for policies that increase the share of female legislators might reflect adherence
to the international development agenda and its message that development is fostered
through the achievement of multiple goals that target different aspects of social and
economic conditions. Governments and political parties willing to adopt policies to
promote gender equality (e.g., the adoption of gender quotas) might also be inclined to
introduce measures that improve child and maternal health, which might ultimately be
an unobserved confounder. Third, it is important to recognize that changes in the
percentage of women in parliament are associated with other types of political
change—notably, turnover in politicians in general, the experience base of politicians,
and balances between parties with different ideological bases, to name a few. If such
factors are themselves associated with policies that affect population health, parameter
estimates for women’s representation are likely to be biased.
By focusing only on the sex of legislators, our study is also inattentive to issues of
intersectionality. Developed through an internal critique of feminist politics, activism,
and scholarship, intersectionality problematizes references to “woman” as a uniform
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category and raises questions about the extent to which otherwise privileged women
share and understand the interests of more-disadvantaged women (Sigle-Rushton and
Lindstrom 2013). The notion of intersectionality suggests that efforts to increase the
share of legislators who are (privileged) women may be less effective than strategies to
increase the formal political participation of multiply marginalized women. Politicians
that represent those (multiply marginalized) groups with the most to gain from policy
intervention may be required. Unfortunately, relative to its theoretical sophistication,
intersectionality’s methodology remains underdeveloped (McCall 2005; Sigle-Rushton
and Lindstrom 2013), and bringing an intersectional lens to cross-national analyses
such as ours is not straightforward. Gender is a primary source of social stratification
throughout the world, but the most relevant intersections with gender specifically with
respect to maternal and child health outcomes will be context-specific; in some places,
it might be social class, but in others, caste or ethnicity may be the most pertinent
modifiers. Future research should explore how to bring an intersectional lens to large-
sample, cross-national comparative studies of political representation. In the meantime,
complementary study designs (e.g., country-specific case studies) can be used to
explore this important issue empirically; see, for example, Halim et al. (2016a) who
examine the intersection of gender and caste in India.
Our research also does not identify the mechanisms by which women’s representa-
tion in contexts of low political and economic development might improve population
health. Prior work has found increases in immunization rates in light of increases in the
number of female representatives (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2014; Quamruzzaman
and Lange 2016; Swiss et al. 2012). Beyond these few studies, evidence is scarce.
Logical mediating factors would be increases in prenatal and postnatal nutrition of
children and mothers, interventions that reduce physiological limitations (e.g., anemia
or exposure to infectious diseases or environmental hazards), improved infrastructure
(e.g., water and sanitation), and increased or more-targeted spending on public health.
Future research that considers such issues would enrich understanding of the link
between women’s participation in formal politics and improvements in population
health.
Efforts to improve developmental trajectories of populations recognize the necessity
of ameliorating disadvantage and fostering the empowerment of marginalized people
(Sen 2001). Our research highlights the potential value of such strategies by showing
links between women’s political representation and mortality risks. Given that global-
ization increasingly connects nation-states, efforts to review, evaluate, and change
political systems in line with emerging international norms are commonplace. Thus,
the value in encouraging efforts to increase the role of women in political leadership is
clear, and such efforts could play a vital role in improving population health. More
importantly, the particular significance of increases in women’s representation for
population health in contexts characterized by low development and weak democratic
infrastructure highlights a critical role that such representation might play in enhancing
developmental trajectories. If development goals are to be achieved, further increases in
women’s political status—although an end in itself—may have important synergistic
effects that improve life chances across the globe.
Acknowledgments We thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for extremely valuable feedback and
advice on earlier versions of this article.
1930 R. Macmillan et al.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Ahmed, S., Qingfend, L., Scrafford, C., & Pullum, T. W. (2014). An assessment of DHS maternal mortality
data and estimates (DHS Methodological Report No. 13). Rockville, MD: ICF International.
Arellano, M. (1993). On the testing of correlated effects with panel data. Journal of Econometrics, 59, 87–97.
Atkinson, A. B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2015). Lectures on public economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Austin, K. F., & Noble, M. D. (2014). Measuring gender disparity in the HIV pandemic: A cross-national
investigation of female empowerment, inequality, and disease in less-developed nations. Sociological
Inquiry, 84, 102–130.
Baker, D. P., Leon, J., Smith Greenaway, E. G., Collins, J., & Movit, M. (2011). The education effect on
population health: A reassessment. Population and Development Review, 37, 307–332.
Batliwala, S., & Dhanraj, D. (2004). Gender myths that instrumentalise women: A view from the Indian
frontline. IDS Bulletin, 35(4), 11–18.
Bhalotra, S., & Clots-Figueras, I. (2014). Health and the political agency of women. American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 6(2), 164–197.
Boehmer, U., & Williamson, J. B. (1996). The impact of women’s status on infant mortality rate: A cross-
national analysis. Social Indicators Research, 37, 333–360.
Bolzendahl, C. (2009). Making the implicit explicit: Gender influences on social spending in twelve
industrialized democracies, 1980–99. Social Politics, 16, 40–81.
Bolzendahl, C., & Brooks, C. (2007). Women’s political representation and welfare state spending in 12
capitalist democracies. Social Forces, 85, 1509–1534.
Brady, D. (2009). Rich democracies, poor people: How politics explain poverty. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Burroway, R. (2012). A cross-national analysis of sex-specific HIV prevalence rates and women’s access to
property, land, and loans in developing countries. International Journal of Sociology, 42(2), 47–67.
Burroway, R. (2016). Democracy and child health in developing countries. International Journal of
Comparative Sociology, 57, 338–364.
Caldwell, J. C. (1986). Routes to low mortality in poor countries. Population and Development Review, 12,
171–220.
Celis, K., Childs, S., Kantola, J., & Krook, M. L. (2008). Rethinking women’s substantive representation.
Representation, 44, 99–110.
Center for the American Woman and Politics. (1991). The impact of women in public office: Findings at a
glance. New Brunswick, NJ: Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University.
Chant, S. (2016). Women, girls, and world poverty: Empowerment, equality or essentialism? International
Development Planning Review, 38, 1–24.
Childs, S., & Krook, M. L. (2006). Should feminists give up on critical mass? A contingent yes. Politics &
Gender, 2, 522–530.
Childs, S., & Krook, M. L. (2008). Critical mass theory and women’s political representation. Political
Studies, 56, 725–736.
Childs, S., & Krook, M. L. (2009). Analysing women’s substantive representation: From critical mass to
critical actors. Government and Opposition, 44, 125–145.
Coale, A. J., & Hoover, E. M. (2015). Population growth and economic development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Dahlerup, D. (2006). The story of the theory of critical mass. Politics & Gender, 2, 511–522.
Deaton, A. (2003). Health, inequality, and economic development. Journal of Economic Literature, 41, 113–
158.
Desai, S., & Alva, S. (1998). Maternal education and child health: Is there a strong causal relationship?
Demography, 35, 71–81.
Diamond, L. J. (1996). Is the third wave over? Journal of Democracy, 7(3), 20–37.
Gender and the Politics of Death 1931
Fallon, K. M., Swiss, L., & Viterna, J. (2012). Resolving the democracy paradox: Democratization and
women’s legislative representation in developing nations, 1975 to 2009. American Sociological Review,
77, 380–408.
Finlay, J. E., Özaltin, E., & Canning, D. (2011). The association of maternal age with infant mortality, child
anthropometric failure, diarrhoea and anaemia for first births: Evidence from 55 low- and middle-income
countries. BMJ Open, 1(2), e000226. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2011-000226
Franco, Á., Álvarez-Dardet, C., & Ruiz, M. T. (2004). Effect of democracy on health: Ecological study. BMJ,
329, 1421–1423. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.329.7480.1421
Fraser, A. M., Brockert, J. E., & Ward, R. H. (1995). Association of young maternal age with adverse
reproductive outcomes. New England Journal of Medicine, 332, 1113–1118.
Grosse, R. N., & Auffrey, C. (1989). Literacy and health status in developing countries. Annual Review of
Public Health, 10, 281–297.
Halaby, C. N. (2004). Panel models in sociological research: Theory into practice. Annual Review of
Sociology, 30, 507–544.
Halim, N., Yount, K. M., & Cunningham, S. (2016a). Do scheduled caste and scheduled tribe women
legislators mean lower gender-caste gaps in primary schooling in India? Social Science Research, 58,
122–134.
Halim, N., Yount, K. M., Cunningham, S. A., & Pande, R. P. (2016b). Women’s political empowerment and
investments in primary schooling in India. Social Indicators Research, 125, 813–851.
Halstead, S. B., Walsh, J. A., & Warren, K. S. (1985). Good health at low cost. New York, NY: The
Rockefeller Foundation.
Homan, P. (2017). Political gender inequality and infant mortality in the United States, 1990–2012. Social
Science & Medicine, 182, 127–135.
Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2016). Women in national parliaments [Data file]. Retrieved from
https://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm
Jackson, C. (2003). Gender analysis of land: Beyond land rights for women? Journal of Agrarian Change, 3,
453–480.
Jones, M. P. (1997). Legislator gender and legislator policy priorities in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies
and the United States House of Representatives. Policy Studies Journal, 25, 613–629.
Kawachi, I., Kennedy, B. P., Gupta, V., & Prothrow-Stith, D. (1999). Women’s status and the health of women
and men: A view from the States. Social Science & Medicine, 48, 21–32.
Kenworthy, L., & Malami, M. (1999). Gender inequality in political representation: Aworldwide comparative
analysis. Social Forces, 78, 235–268.
Kittilson, M. C. (2008). Representing women: The adoption of family leave in comparative perspective.
Journal of Politics, 70, 323–334.
Lena, H. F., & London, B. (1993). The political and economic determinants of health outcomes: A cross-
national analysis. International Journal of Health Services, 23, 585–602.
Longhofer, W., Schofer, E., Miric, N., & Frank, D. J. (2016). NGOs, INGOs, and environmental policy
reform, 1970–2010. Social Forces, 94, 1743–1768.
Mackay, F. (2014). Nested newness, institutional innovation, and the gendered limits of change. Politics &
Gender, 10, 549–571.
Malhotra, A., & Schuler, S. R. (2005). Women’s empowerment as a variable in international development. In
D. Narayan (Ed.), Measuring empowerment: Cross-disciplinary perspectives (pp. 71–88). Washington,
DC: World Bank.
Mansbridge, J. (1999). Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A contingent “yes.”
Journal of Politics, 61, 628–657.
Mansbridge, J. (2003). Rethinking representation. American Political Science Review, 97, 515–528.
Marshall, M. G. (2005).Major episodes of political violence 1946–2004. Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace.
Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm
Marshall, M. G., & Cole, B. R. (2014). Global report 2014: Conflict, governance, and state fragility. Vienna,
VA: Center for Systematic Peace.
Martin, M. (2000). The almanac of women and minorities in world politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
McCall, L. (2005). The complexity of intersectionality. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 30,
1771–1800.
Navarro, V., Muntaner, C., Borrell, C., Benach, J., Quiroga, Á., Rodríguez-Sanz, M., . . . Pasarín, M. I. (2006).
Politics and health outcomes. Lancet, 368, 1033–1037.
Nelson, B. J., & Caudhuri, N. (1994).Women and politics worldwide. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Paxton, P. (1997). Women in national legislatures: A cross-national analysis. Social Science Research, 26,
442–464.
1932 R. Macmillan et al.
Paxton, P., & Kunovich, S. (2003). Women’s political representation: The importance of ideology. Social
Forces, 82, 87–113.
Phillips, A. (1994). Dealing with difference: A politics of ideas or a politics of presence? Constellations, 1, 74–
91.
Phillips, A. (1995). The politics of presence. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
Phillips, A. (1998). Democracy and representation: Or, why should it matter who our representatives are? In A.
Phillips (Ed.), Oxford readings in feminism: Feminism and politics (pp. 224–240). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Pitkin, H. F. (1967). The concept of representation. Oakland: University of California Press.
Polity IV Project. (2016). Polity IV Project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2015.
Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
Preston, S. H. (1975). The changing relation between mortality and level of economic development.
Population Studies, 29, 231–248.
Quadagno, J. (1987). Theories of the welfare state. Annual Review of Sociology, 13, 109–128.
Quamruzzaman, A., & Lange, M. (2016). Female political representation and child health: Evidence from a
multilevel analysis. Social Science & Medicine, 171, 48–57.
Raftery, A. E. (1995). Bayesian model selection in social research. Sociological Methodology, 25, 111–163.
Ross, M. (2006). Is democracy good for the poor? American Journal of Political Science, 50, 860–874.
Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. (2006). Still supermadres? Gender and the policy priorities of Latin American
legislators. American Journal of Political Science, 50, 570–585.
Sen, A. (1988). The concept of development. Handbook of Development Economics, 1, 9–26.
Sen, A. (1998). Mortality as an indicator of economic success and failure. Economic Journal, 108, 1–25.
Sen, A. (2001). Development as freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Shandra, J. M., Nobles, J. E., London, B., & Williamson, J. B. (2005). Multinational corporations, democracy
and child mortality: A quantitative, cross-national analysis of developing countries. Social Indicators
Research, 73, 267–293.
Shen, C., & Williamson, J. B. (1999). Maternal mortality, women’s status, and economic dependency in less
developed countries: A cross-national analysis. Social Science & Medicine, 49, 197–214.
Sigle-Rushton, W., & Lindstrom, E. (2013). Intersectionality. In M. Evans & C. Williams (Eds.), Gender: The
key concepts (pp. 129–135). Abington, UK: Routledge.
Swiss, L., Fallon, K. M., & Burgos, G. (2012). Does critical mass matter? Women’s political representation
and child health in developing countries. Social Forces, 91, 531–558.
UNESCO. (2016). Institute for Statistics database. Montreal, Quebec: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
Retrieved from http://data.uis.unesco.org/
United Nations. (2008). The Millennium Development Goals report 2008. New York, NY: United Nations
Publications.
United Nations. (2015). Millennium Development Goal 8: Taking stock of the global partnership for
development (MDG Gap Task Force Report 2015). New York, NY: United Nations.
United Nations Equal Opportunities Commission. (2003). United Nations targets for proportion of women in
leadership and decision-making positions (Report). New York, NY: United Nations.
United Nations Millennium Project. (2005). Investing in development: A practical plan to achieve the
Millennium Development Goals. Overview. New York, NY: United Nations.
United Nations Women. (2017). UN women annual report 2016–2017. New York, NY: United Nations.
Vaisey, S., & Miles, A. (2017). What you can—and can’t—do with three-wave panel data. Sociological
Methods & Research, 46, 44–67.
Wängnerud, L. (2009). Women in parliaments: Descriptive and substantive representation. Annual Review of
Political Science, 12, 51–69.
Wängnerud, L., & Sundell, A. (2012). Do politics matter? Women in Swedish local elected assemblies 1970–
2010 and gender equality in outcomes. European Political Science Review, 4, 97–120.
Ware, H. (1984). Effects of maternal education, women’s roles, and child care on child mortality. Population
and Development Review, 10, 191–214.
Waylen, G. (2014). Informal institutions, institutional change, and gender equality. Political Research
Quarterly, 67, 212–223.
Wilensky, H. L. (1974). The welfare state and equality: Structural and ideological roots of public expendi-
tures. Berkeley: University of California Press.
World Bank. (2017). World development indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Health Organization (WHO) Department of Information, Evidence and Research. (2016). WHO
methods and data sources for life tables 1990–2015 (Global Health Estimates Technical Paper WHO/
HIS/IER/GHE/2016.8). Geneva, Switzerland: WHO.
Gender and the Politics of Death 1933
You, D., Hug, L., Ejdemyr, S., Idele, P., Hogan, D., Mathers, C., . . . Alkema, L. (2015). Global, regional, and
national levels and trends in under-5 mortality between 1990 and 2015, with scenario-based projections to
2030: A systematic analysis by the UN inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation. Lancet, 386,
2275–2286.
Young, I. M. (1994). Gender as seriality: Thinking about women as a social collective. Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society, 19, 713–738.
Young, I. M. (2002). Inclusion and democracy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
1934 R. Macmillan et al.
